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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to unbundle the main economic variables involved in the European Crisis 
and clarify their reciprocal relationship. The variables considered are: unemployment, inflation, 
consumptions, investments and current accounts. We use annual, quarterly and monthly data, 
until 2012, mid-2013 or an estimate of 2013 for the main European countries. The main results 
are the following: a) we show an emerging European economic divide, b) we detect a quasi-Okun 
relationship between investment and unemployment, c) we show the revival of the Phillips curve, 
especially in Germany, d) we test for the relationship between unemployment and the 
Government deficit, e) we show the existence of a relationship between unemployment and 
current account, f) we show how countries with high unemployment rate could bear the burden, 
g) we unbundle the unemployment-current account relationship, showing first the relationship 
between unemployment and final consumption, h) and then between final consumption, imports 
and current account, i) we show why a stable and growing inflation differential is not 
sustainable, but argue that internal devalution is not an effective policy, pushing inflation rates 
to a worrisome lower level and even outright deflation, l) we argue and show how to implement 
a more effective policy looking to the inflation differentials of specific products, looking to the 
case of Italy, m) we analyze the trade relationship between Germany and China, arguing that 
since the onset of the EMU and the successive membership of China to the WTO, a European 
structural break occurred, with some European countries relying much more on exports rather 
than domestic demand. A more general issue of sustainability and replicability of the Germany’s 
export led growth model is raised.  
Jel codes: E24, E29, E30, E31, F32, F40,  H62, 052 
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Introduction. 
The Great Recession, stemming from the US, prompted a Sovereign Debt Crisis in the 
European economies and brought about a double-dip recession, in 2009 and 2012-2013, and 
therefore a Great European Recession: country inflation rates converged while 
unemployment diverged, public debt/GDP ratio surged as a consequence of the GDP sharp fall, 
especially in the Southern European countries. The fiscal measures implemented in the crisis 
countries of the Euro Area, since 2010, were aimed at two goals: reducing the public 
debt/GDP ratio and the current account deficit. The two objectives have been pursued with 
two instruments: fiscal measures to reduce public deficit, by taxes increases and public 
spending reductions, and internal devalutation, with the purpose of reducing real exchange 
misalignment and improve competitiveness.   The instruments proved successful in turning 
positive the current account deficits curtailing domestic demand, however at the cost of a 
steep increase of unemployment rate together with a sharp decline of the inflation rate, well 
below the ECB target. The austerity has revived an inflation-unemployment relationship 
which resemble the Phillips’ curve, however driven by a sudden and lasting excess supply in 
the goods market, and as a consequence in the labor market. 
1. The theoretical framework 
We focus our analysis on the relationships between five key endogenous variables - 
consumption, investments, unemployment, inflation and current account - for the main 
countries of Euro Area.  The exogenous variables are the instruments, fiscal policy and 
internal devalutation, aimed at the two goals of fiscal and current account deficits.  The 
following picture   shows the chain of relationships  on which we will center our analysis. 
Figure 1 
 
Within the Euro Area the traditional Tinbergen target-instrument approach needs to be 
supplemented by a Hurwicz decentralized mechanism, which is better suited to highlights the 
decentralized economic imbalances arising from different countries’ fundamentals and 
decision processes. Indeed the Great European Recession brought about new patterns of 
behavior and, notably, the comeback of economic divergence. It should be noticed that 
unemployment is not a primary goal of Euro Area or the European Union and the European 
Central Bank has instead inflation as a primary goal , in spite of the fact that unemployment  is 
a strong predictor of all the aggregate variables we consider, not to mention its fundamental 
social value. In fact European economies had to address the well-known problem of achieving 
simultanously internal and external balance, with common instruments and goals but quite 
different economic fundamentals for each country.  
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4 
Our purpose is to unbundle the main economic relationships among five key endogenous 
aggregates, and their relationship with the unemployment rate, to understand causes and 
consequences of the European Crisis. We will therefore analyze each one of the connections 
among the macroeconomic variables, in aggregate and for the main countries. 
 
Figure 2      
 
 
2. Economic policy and democracy 
The Great European Recession arose new and unexpected problems of democratic consensus, 
because the implementation of fiscal and internal devalution policies caused a double-dip 
recession in the countries in which the public deficit and the current account deficit was 
highest: the main European institutions, like the European Central Bank and the European 
Commission, came to the forefront of the political debate. The issue of democratic consensus 
was compounded by the asymmetry of the economic burden in terms of unemployment and 
standard of living, without a broad political consensus. 
The political economy problem in terms of democratic consensus can be better appreciated 
by looking to the absolute change of the Gross Domestic Product for each country (we exclude 
Croatia because it entered the European Union since January 2012), together with their 
population, as shown in table 1, where countries were ranked in ascending order. 
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  Table 1 -  GDP 2012-2008 (chain-linked) 
Country 
GDP millions 
(-) 
population 
2012 (000) Country 
GDP 
millions (+) 
population 
2012 (000) 
Italy -86.369 60.821 Estonia 42 1.334 
Spain -54.873 46.818 Malta 166 418 
United Kingdom -47.210 63.495 Slovakia 1.985 5.404 
Greece -41.925 11.123 Belgium 3.493 11.095 
Netherlands -14.059 16.730 Austria 4.092 8.408 
Ireland -9.218 4.583 France 9.614 65.328 
Portugal -8.688 10.542 Sweden 16.404 9.483 
Denmark -7.953 5.581 Poland 36.369 38.538 
Finland -6.404 5.401 Germany 63.840 81.844 
Hungary -5.494 9.932       
Romania -4.919 20.096       
Slovenia -2.862 2.055       
Czech Republic -1.693 10.505       
Latvia -1.535 2.045       
Lithuania -1.251 3.004       
Bulgaria -730 7.327       
Cyprus -392 862       
Luxembourg -318 525       
Total (-) -295.891 281.446 Total (+) 136.005 221.851 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
These data show that the Great Recession and the Sovereign Debt Crisis hit unevenly 
European countries: the countries with a GDP decrease totalled 56% of the European Union 
population and recorded a decrease of -296 billion of GDP, while the countries with a GDP 
increase totalled 44% of the EU population, recording an increase of 136 billions. In other 
words the European economic policy brought about 2,1 euro of GDP loss in 18 countries for 1 
euro of GDP gain in 9 countries: as a result the GDP gap widened. Italy, Spain, U.K. and Greece 
recorded the highest (absolute) decrease of GDP, while Germany, Poland, Sweden and France 
recorded the highest increase. Because the economic policy instruments, namely monetary 
policy and to a large extent also the fiscal policy, are at European level, some form of cost-
benefit analysis, and potential redistribution of the common benefits, should have been 
expected. The loose coordination of the economic policies for the common benefit entails the 
risk of a drop of democratic consensus for the European project.  
3. Final Consumption and Investments 
The European crisis has been, to a large extent, a domestic crisis: if we sum Final 
Consumption to Gross Fixed Capital Formation (i.e. Gross Fixed Investments) it is possible to 
rank countries in relation to this crucial domestic aggregate. Not surprisingly, the countries 
which recorded the highest (absolute) decrease of GDP were Spain, Italy, Greece and UK, 
while the countries with the highest increase were Germany, Poland, France and Germany. 
The comparison of table 1 and 2 shows, implicitly, that the fall of domestic demand was the 
driving force behind the (second) recession: while the first recession (in 2009) hit alike all 
European countries the second was the consequence of fiscal consolidation and internal 
devalutation, and hit unevenly the European countries.  In this case the gap between the 
decreasing and increasing countries was wider: the decreasing countries totalled 56% of the 
European Union population and a value of -507 billions, while the increasing countries 
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totalled 44% of population and an increase of +146 billions, which means a loss of 3,5 euro for 
1 dollar gain.  
 
Table 2 - UE Country 2012-2008 (Final Consumption + Gross Fixed Capital Formation) 
Country 
Consumption + 
Fixed Investments 
    millions (-) 
population 
2012 (000) countries 
Consumption + 
Fixed Investments 
   millions (+) 
population 
2012 (000) 
Spain -132.593 46.818 Finland 633 5.401 
Italy -111.000 60.821 Luxembourg 1.032 525 
Greece -64.688 11.123 Belgium 3.593 11.095 
U.K. -62.897 63.495 Austria 6.860 8.408 
Ireland -30.524 4.583 Sweden 16.147 9.483 
Netherlands -23.827 16.730 France 19.307 65.328 
Portugal -21.985 10.542 Poland 22.406 38.538 
Romania -12.985 20.096 Germany 76.103 81.844 
Hungary -11.095 9.932       
Denmark -8.863 5.581       
Czech Rep. -5.100 10.505       
Slovenia -4.699 2.055       
Lithuania -4.289 3.004       
Bulgaria -4.288 7.327       
Latvia -2.906 2.045       
Cyprus -1.968 862       
Slovakia -1.744 5.404       
Estonia -1.212 1.334       
Malta -37 418       
Total (-) -506.700 282.675 Total (+) 146.079 220.622 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database – (chain linked) 
 
The distinction between Final Consumption and Gross Fixed Capital Formation – Investment 
for brief - rises the question of the relationship between the two aggregates: according to our 
approach a fall of Final Consumption should be the the cause of a corresponding fall of 
investments. A cross-section relationship is compatible with this direction of causality: to 
reduce the possible collinearity between consumption and investments we take the rate of 
changes of the two variables, from 2008 to 2012, assuming that the direction of causality goes 
from the consumption to the investment. The cross-section relationship is defined as: 
 
                     ̇       ̇                        (1) 
 
 
The plot shows a positive fit: an increase of (chain- linked) final consumption is associated to 
an increase of investment for the European Union countries (figure 3). 
A increasing demand can also come from abroad, balancing the fall of the domestic demand: 
to check this aspect we take the EU (27) export increase, from 2008 to 2012, and compute the 
share of the total increase for each country. The result is that, over the period, the bulk of the 
increase (42%) is concentrated in Germany, followed by The Netherland (13%): therefore 
export demand played a significant role only for these two countries. Exports has been 
concentrated in Germany and The Netherland, which are the main channels of spillovers on 
the other European countries. 
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Figure 3     
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
To analyze the relationship between investments and unemployment rate we posit the 
following (quasi-Okun) relationship, measured on quarterly data, from 2006Q1 to 2013Q2 for 
the European Union (27): 
                      (
       
    
)                          (2) 
 
Figure 4 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
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A percentage reduction of investment at quarter t, against quarter (t-4), for example -15,1%, 
causes an increase of the unemployment rate, equal to (Ut – Ut-4)=2 points over a year. The 
quasi-Okun relatioship holds quite well for many countries, like Spain, Portugal, Ireland, 
Poland, Germany, France and Italy. It should not come as a surprise that over this period also 
a normal Okun relationship holds, with the quarter GDP annual change, both for European 
Union (27) and the Euro Area (17), and – in some cases in a weaker form – for the above 
countries.  
4. Double-dip recession in Europe and the German Phillips curve 
Economic convergence is the main goal of the European project, because it is a socially 
valuable outcome and its achievement should allow a closer political integration: however a 
crucial and perhaps unexpected problem of the Great Recession has been a widening of the 
economic and social gaps.  In fact if we look to the period 2009-2013, we can check a steady 
increase of the unemployement rate for almost all the European countries, while the inflation 
rate plunged to a low in 2009 and, again, decreased sharply in 2012. A diverging pattern 
emerged within the European Union countries (27): the variability of the monthly inflation 
rates, year-on-year, decreased (measured by the standard deviation) while the 
unemployment (measured monthly) steadily increased (figure 5). 
The Great European Recession has also revived the Phillips curve, the empirical regularity 
between money wages changes and unemployment rate discovered by Phillips (1958), which 
was given a theoretical foundation by Lipsey (1960) and generalization by Samuelson and 
Solow (1960) in the form of a short run relationship between inflation and unemployment 
rate, with an explicit account for expectations in the long run. They suggested also the 
possibility of “histeresis”, and, looking to the long run, they argued that “the level of attained 
growth will be highly correlated with the degree of full employment and high-capacity 
output”. This insight is close to “Okun law” (1962) analysis of the “Potential GNP” and its 
relationship with the unemployment rate, which also we proved to be still valid, in relation 
with investment.  
We first analyze the inflation-unemployment relationship during the Great Recession (2009-
2012) and then, in the following section, we focus on the period after the fiscal consolidation 
policies, started in late 2011.  
In the longer run (2009-2012) the inflation-unemployment relationship does not exhibit a 
Phillips behavior: rather it characterizes a double-dip recession, the first in 2009 following 
the sudden stop after the Lehman default and the second as the consequence on 
unemployment and inflation of the fiscal consolidation.  Figure 6 shows the dynamic of  
inflation, as a function of unemployment, from January 2009 to September 2013, for the 
countries of the European Union (27): the best polynomial interpolation is clearly non-linear 
and of higher order of the one shown in the figure. The aggregate douple-dip recession is 
therefore a mixture of different patterns: Spain, Portugal, Netherland and Bulgaria are better 
interpolated by a double-dip pattern, while Italy shows a quadratic and Ireland an inverse 
quadratic pattern (see Appendix A for a detailed account).  
The crucial exception is Germany where a well-defined Phillips curve arises, with the correct 
inverse clockwise pattern (figure 7): in 2009 welfare state automatic stabilizers (Campiglio, 
2013) helped Germany to smooth the economic impact of the crisis and from 2010 onwards 
unemployment rate gradually reduced, until 5.7% in October 2011 while inflation increased 
to 2.9%. From October 2011 to September 2013 unemployment rate fell further to 5.2% and, 
contrary to Phillips normal pattern, inflation decreased furthermore to 1.1%.  Indeed, the 
Phillips curve seems to be a still relevant relationship for the Germany economy, with some 
appropriate qualifications (Quaas and Klein, 2010).  
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Figure 5 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
  
 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
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Figure 7 
    
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
5. Phillips curve and fiscal consolidation 
 
The Sovereign Debt Crisis triggered the European economic crisis when the Greek crisis, 
acting as a Black Swan, revived the risk premium of Euro Area countries against the German 
financial assets: in April 2010 Greek public debt was downgraded to the level of junk-bonds 
and a bailout loan by the IMF was granted, conditional on measures of economic austerity. 
The financial market turmoil spread from Greece to all the Souther European countries, 
becoming a systemic crisis and reached a common turning point on October 2011. In October 
2011 Moody’s announced, and then made official, a rating downgrade of France; in Italy a new 
government was set up, while in Portugal bonds risk premium was on the rise and the ECB 
reduced the interest rate. If we look more closely to this period, selecting the dates closest to 
the relevant turning points (Bellavite Pellegrini, Meoli, Pellegrini, Urga - 2013), a Phillips 
curve, stemming from the goods market, can be identified. 
 
Figure 8 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
January 2009 
July 2009 
October 2011 
September 2013 
y = -0.6284x2 + 7.5059x - 20.176 
R² = 0.8611 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5
In
fl
a
ti
o
n
 y
o
y
 
Unemployment - monthly 
Germany: Inflation-Unemployment 
January 2009-September 2013 (57 months) 
2011-04 
2013-09 y = -1.059x2 + 20.657x - 97.544 
R² = 0.8982 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
9.0 9.5 10.0 10.5 11.0 11.5
In
fl
a
ti
o
n
 Y
o
y
 
Unemployment rate - monthly 
European Union (27) Inflation-Unemployment 
April 2011-September 2013 (30 months) 
 
 
 
11 
 
Figure 9  
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
In figure 8 and 9 we identify the inflation-unemployment relationship, on a monthly basis, 
since April 2011 until September 2013 for the Euro Area (17) and the European Union (27), 
while in the Appendix B we make the same for the main countries. The estimate is of the form: 
 
      ̇            (3a) 
       
      ̇              
                                   (3b) 
 
where U is the unemployment rate and   ̇  is the rate of inflation (HICP) year on year on a 
monthly basis (Price Index (t)/Price Index (t-12) – 1)*100. 
 
  The inflation-unemployment relationship is confirmed, with both the analytical 
specifications, and the following qualifications:        
1. the non-linear negative relationship between inflation and unemployment, both for the 
Euro Area and the European Union, suggests a close interconnection and contagion, 
from the Euro Area to the European Union. 
2. The inflation-unemployment relationship, unlike the traditional Phillips Curve, stems 
directly from the goods market – rather than the labor market – and the falling 
inflation is the consequence of the fiscal consolidation and the ensuing fall of 
disposable income and consumption. 
3. from the Appendix B we can check the differences between the European countries: 
the relationship is linear in Greece since August 2010, as well as France, Portugal, 
Cyprus since October 2011; it is quadratic in Italy since October 2011 and in Spain 
since October 2012. In Germany and Ireland the relation between inflation and 
unemployment is instead positive since October 2011, with a time decreasing 
unemployment associated with a simultaneous decreas of inflation. 
4.  the traditional Phillips curve exhibits counterclockwise loops and, with the 
Samuelson-Solow extension, this should mean an increasing inflation when 
unemployment decrease and a slower inflation when unemployment increses. We do 
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not observe clear loops for Greece, Portugal, Cyprus and France but rather a linear 
relationship, probably because of the short period considered: it is hower the direction 
one would expect in a depressed economy. In Italy we see a half-loop but on the 
opposite side. In Germany and Ireland we find a remarkable inverse relationship, with 
inflation and unemployment rates moving in the same direction. In the case of Spain 
the relationship hold only for the period October 2012-September 2013: for a better 
understanding we need to revert to the previous longer time-span. 
The original Phillips curve relates money wage changes to the unemployment rate, and 
therefore its dynamic is driven by the labor market and the demand-supply relationship: 
Samuelson and Solow extension relates price changes to the unemployment rate, and as a 
consequence its dynamic is instead driven by the good market and its demand-supply 
relationship. Samuelson and Solow hypothesis becomes relevant within the Clower’s insight 
(1965) about the “dual decision hypothesis”: in other words, as a genereral rule people 
increase their labor supply “because” they would like to consume more. Generalizing both 
hypothesis we can argue that the Phillips curve should be reinterpreted as a binding 
constraint on households’ planned expenditures, when disposable income falls below a 
critical level: when real disposable income declines, because of higher taxes, consumption in 
the market for goods declines and so the demand for labor by the firms. Steadily increasing 
unemployment reduces households’ disposable income and their consumption, causing 
overcapacity, slower price increases and, in some cases, an absolute decline. 
6. Unemployment, public debt and deficit   
 
The sharp GDP decline caused by the Great Recession increased automatically the Public 
Debt/GDP ratio: as a major example it is useful to look at the unfolding of the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis in Italy (figure 10). In 2007 befor the onset of the Great Recession the Public Debt/GDP 
ratio was 103,3: between 2007 and 2012 the nominal GDP increased a meagre 0,8%, while 
the public debt continued to grow on its trend, increasing 23,9%, and the Public Debt/GDP 
ratio increased +23% (as a matter of arithmetic). As a counterfactual we can ask which the 
Public Debt/GDP ratio would have been, should the nominal GDP had grown on its trend since 
1999: to make the exercise we simply made a linear interpolation from 1999 to 2007 
(R2=0,996) and projected the estimate to the years 2008-2012. Figure 11 shows what the 
Public Debt/GDP ratio would have been, should the nominal GDP had grown on its trend: the 
difference from 2008 to 2012 is obviously related to the output gap, a crucial economic 
concept for the economic policy, whose estimate is however subject to a wide margin of 
uncertainty ( the 8 points increase of the Debt/GDP ratio is a measure of the structural 
problem related to a potential GDP growing too slow).  
The Public Debt/GDP ratio has been a primary goal of economic policy in all the European 
countries, however achieved only in Sweden, where also unemployment rate fell: Sweden is 
the only country in Europe to achieve both goals. For all the other European countries the 
results are mixed: with the exception of Hungary, the public debt/GDP ratio increased 
everywhere, but unemployment rate decreased in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, Finland and Malta (figure 12). The counterpart of this pattern is a 
close relationship between the level of government deficit/GDP in 2012 and the change of  
unemployment rate between from 2009 to 2012 (figure 13 - positive values for the deficit). In 
2012 all the European countries recorded a government deficit, with the exception of 
Germany: in 2012, 16 countries recorded a deficit above the 3% of the GDP, and for 14 
countries the unemployment rate was  above 10%.   
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Figure 10 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
Figure 11 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
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Figure 12 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
Figure 13 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
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competitiveness of each countries: at the same time the current account of the Euro Area can 
be positive while for many countries can be steadily in deficit, raising increasing doubts on 
the capacity to repay foreign debts, either denominated in euro or other strong currencies. 
This aspect is clearly at variance with what happens in the US.  
Assuming exports are exogenous (the small country hypothesis applies) for each country, the 
unemployment rate (U) drives the final consumption (FC), imports decrease and the current 
account (CA): then we should find out a composite function relating the unemployment rate 
to the current account through the final consumption, via imports, i.e.: 
 
                                                    (4) 
because:         
                                            (5)  
given: 
               ̅̅ ̅̅                          (6) 
and                        
                                              (7)  
First of all we check wheter the final relationship (4) holds, over the period 2009Q1-2013Q2, 
on the basis of quarterly data. For the European Union (27) a positive relationship arises: the 
zero balance of  the current account is however associated with a high level of unemployment 
(around 9%). This is happened however in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland, during 
the Great Recession: the unemployment rate associated to zero balance is quite low in  
Netherland while in Germany no relationship arises. 
Figure 15 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
7. Unemployment and Current Account in the longer run  
The question arises whether the relationship between unemployment and current account, 
analyzed since the Great Recession, can be generalized to the long term, since the inception of 
the Euro: the answer is affirmative, allowing further insights on the pattern of the current 
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adjustment. For the European Union the relationship between unemployment and current 
account, from 1999 to 2012, is the following (Figure 16):  
Figure 16 
 
 Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
The relationship for the European Union (27) measured on annual data is similar to that 
computed on quarterly data: the unemployment rate associated to the zero balance of the 
current account is only slightly lower, 8,5%; the linear fit is good but without no clear time 
pattern.  
However, if we consider the main European countries a number of interesting patterns arise. 
In Greece, Portugal, Spain the current account balance has been negative since 1999: in all the 
three countries there was however a sharp improvement in 2012, starting with 2009. The 
drawback is that the improvement was the result of a dramatic increase of the unemployment 
rate, reaching 25% for Greece and Spain and 16% in Portugal. Ireland and Italy have recorded 
a similar pattern. In Ireland the current account balance in 1999 was positive, became 
moderately negative in 2005 and plunged in 2009, with an immediate recovery in 2010, and a 
an increasingly positive balance since then. In Italy the current account balance started 
positive in 1999, hovered around zero balance until 2005, became negative from 2008 to 
2011, while recovering close the zero balance in 2012. In Italy and Ireland, however, the 
adjustement process was prompted by an increase of unemployment to more than 10% in 
Italy and 15% in Ireland. In the case of Italy a counterclok loop also appears. The case of  The 
Netherlands is interesting because this country shows a robust positive relationship between 
the unemployment rate and the current account: however the current account balance is 
always positive and the unemployment rate is lowest in 2001 (2,5%) and highest in 2012 
(9,4%). For Germany, France and Sweden the relationship between unemployment and 
current account show no clear pattern, and in the following section we suggest an explanation 
based on the effectiveness of the schemes of unemployment insurance and, more generally, of 
the welfare system.  
8. Unemployment and social insurance 
The high level of unemployment rate caused by the fiscal measures in many European 
countries, the sizable amount of wasted potential output and employment ask the question of 
their social sustainability: for a better understanding we need to take in account the role of 
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social protection benefits provided as an insurance against unemployment. If we consider the 
most recent data available – for the year 2011 – we can make a comparison of the 
unemployment rate with the unemployment benefits for the small set of countries on which 
we draw more attention (table 3).  
The highest unemployment rate in Spain (21,7%) is associated with the highest share of 
unemployment benefits (as % of GDP), as well as in the case of Greece and Ireland, where a 
high unemployment rate is associated with a higher share of  unemployment benefits. Ireland 
stands out as the country with the highest value of euro per inhabitant, followed by Spain, 
Denmark and France. Italy is the country with the lowest level of unemployment benefits (as a 
share of GDP), which can be accounted by two main reasons: the high level of shadow 
economy (21,6% of GDP in 2012)2 and the highest share of zero of enterprises of class zero 
(i.e. no paid employee) in Europe 3 (table 2), which include a high share of quasi-employee, for 
which the unemployment measurement is meaningless. 
 
Table 3 
Country/Time 
Unemploymen
t rate 
Unemploymen
t benefits  -        
% GDP 
Euro per 
inhabitant 
(constant 
2005 prices) 
Total Social 
protection 
benefits -    
% GDP  
GEO/TIME 2011 
Denmark 7,6 1,8 685 32,8 
Germany 5,9 1,3 386 28,3 
Ireland 14,7 3,3 1.166 28,3 
Greece 17,7 2,1 334 28,9 
Spain 21,7 3,7 732 25,6 
France 9,6 2,1 588 31,9 
Italy 8,4 0,8 187 28,4 
Cyprus 7,9 1,2 219 22,4 
Netherlands 4,4 1,5 482 30,5 
Portugal 12,9 1,4 201 25 
Sweden 7,8 1,2 410 29 
          
European Union (27) 9,7 1,6 361 27,8 
Euro area (17) 10,1 1,8 468 28,8 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 The estimate of the shadow economy (2012) are 24% in Greece, 19,2% in Spain and 12,7% in Ireland. 
“Shadow Economy and Undeclared Work”, European Commission,  
3  European Commission (2011) “Key figures on European business, with a special feature” Eurostat, p. 
19 and statistical annexes 
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Figure 17 
 
Eurostat (2011) “Key figures on European Business with a special feature on SMESs”, European 
Commission 
 
9. Unemployment and Final Consumption Expenditures. 
In this section we focus on the relationship between unemployment and final consumption 
expenditure, as previously defined: 
 
                                                            (7’)   
       
 
 Final consumption expenditures is the sum of three main aggregates: the final consumption 
expenditures of households, the final consumption expenditures of the government and the 
NPISH (Non Profit Institutions Serving Households). Focusing on the interaction of 
households’ final consumption  and government consumption we can divide European 
countries in three categories, over the 2012-2008 period: 
a) Countries where both household and government consumption expenditures declined: 
they were Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Portugal (11) 
b) countries where both household and government expenditures increased: they were 
Belgium, Germany, France Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Poland, Finland, Sweden (9) 
c) countries where the decrease of household consumption was matched by a (lower) 
government increase, and as a consequence a decrease of Final Consumption: they 
were Denmark, Estonia, Cyprus, Netherland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, United 
Kindom. (8) 
Therefore the Final Consumption (private and public) decreased in 19 countries, while 
increased in 8 countries: final consumption of households is around 70% of total Final 
Consumption in the European Union and therefore it is also the main culprit of the 
consumption slump in the period, causing a corresponding output and employment reduction. 
The slump in the 19 countries was the consequence of the fiscal austerity which reduced 
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households’ disposable income, and in 11 countries also the final consumption of the 
government. In the following we focus on the main aggregate of the Final Consumption in 
total. 
We consider first the unemployment-final consumption relationship for the Euro Area (17), 
over the period 2009Q1-2013Q2, to analyze its evolution during the Great European Crisis. 
From the second quarter 2010 the unemployment rate in the Euro Area recorded a decline 
until the second quarter 2011: the fourth quarter 2011 marks the first impact of the fiscal 
austerity on the rate of change of the Final Consumption (over the corresponding quarter 
2010) which started to decline while the unemployment rate was again on the rise. The best 
fit is still a non- linear double-dip: we gain a much better understanding of the process 
looking to the crisis-ridden countries. The fit is linear negative, and improved, if we select 
Italy (since 2009Q1), Spain (since 2009Q4), Portugal (since 2009Q1), Cyprus (since 2009Q4), 
Netherlands (since 2009Q1): again Ireland shows instead a positive relationship (see 
Appendix E) 
 
Figure 18 
 
 Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
The aggregate data for the Euro Area and the European Union still mask, however, the 
different impact of the fiscal austerity on the Final Consumption of each country and its 
weight on the aggregate: to get a clearer picture of the impact of the fiscal measures we make 
up a more specific comparison, focusing  on a sample of major European countries for which 
we can assess more clearly the starting period of the fiscal austerity (to unbundle the different 
phases of the Great Crisis it is necessary to reconcile unemployment and consumption with 
the timing of the policy decisions: see Bellavite Pellegrini, Meoli, Pellegrini, Urga, 2013). 
The starting quarter of the austerity period for each major country was selected when the 
final consumption declined for at least four quarters in a row, while the ending period was the 
latest available data. The quarterly data selected are values in real volumes, adjusted for 
seasons and working days and the third column shows the estimates of the consumption 
decline over the fiscal austerity period. The following columns show the difference in the 
quarterly consumption – chain linked, base 2005 – between the first quarter of 2008 and the 
latest available, for the second quarter of 2012.  The last column show the difference – annual 
data from 2008 until 2012, of the Final Consumption for the Euro Area countries, also in real 
volumes. 
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Table 4 
Country Fiscal 
Austerity 
Starting 
quarter 
Fiscal Austerity 
Latest quarter 
Fiscal 
austerity  
∆% real 
consumption 
     Great Crisis 
 ∆ real consumption 
2013-2 (-) 2008-1 
(millions euro qtly ) 
    Great Crisis 
∆ real consumption 
   2012-2008 
(millions euro-year) 
Italy          2011-3          2013-2           -5,8            -18.557         -48.987 
Spain          2011-2          2013-2           -6,5            -15.662         -41.870 
Portugal          2011-1          2013-2         -11,3              -3.249         -10.594 
Ireland          2009-1          2013-2           -8,8              -3.198         -   9.725 
Greece          2010-1          2011-1         -10,0              -3.312         -39.342 
Cyprus          2012-2          2013-2           -7,1                 -260          -     675 
Netherland          2011-2          2013-2           -3,1              -1.967          - 4.177 
Germany                26.920           86.214 
France                15.112           48.141 
Belgium                  2.752             8.849 
Austria                  2.018             6.686 
Total                     601             5.480 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database. Greek data are unavailable after 2011-1.  
 
The quarterly data for Greece are available only until the first quarter of 2011. Quarterly data 
and annual data are not strictly comparable because of the time pattern and the statistical 
adjustments for the quarterly data.   
The table shows clearly the wide differences within the Euro Area and allows a different 
perspective on the two periods: Italy has been the country with the sharpest absolute value of 
final consumption decline, both annually and quarterly, while Spain was only slightly below. 
Greece, Portugal and Cyprus recorded the sharpest relative decline: Netherland joined the 
group of the countries with consumption decline, even if with a smaller relative and absolute 
impact. The Euro Area, however, was not homogenous: Germany and France, and also 
Belgium and Austria with a lower volume, recorded a significant increase of final 
consumption over the entire period of the Great Crisis, from 1998 to 2012. The divergent 
patter of consumption is coherent with the increasing variability of the unemployment rate 
inside the Euro Area and the European Union (figure 5): increasing unemployment rate 
entails a decrease of final consumption (as a percentage of the previous year) on a quarterly 
basis for Italy, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, and Netherland. In the case of Ireland the relationship 
is instead positive, i.e. an increasing unemployment rate is associated with a slowing decrease 
of consumption: the high unemployment benefit in Ireland, given a high involuntary 
unemployment, seems a plausibile explanation for this pattern.  We should expect, however, 
that the average consumption level  has a lower bound and cannot continue for ever. 
 
10. Final Consumption, Imports and Current Account 
The slump of domestic final consumption for the aforementioned countries brought about an 
improvement of the current account by shrinking import: exports recorded a low, but positive 
rate of growth and by the end of 2013 the current account balance improved and became 
positive. 
                                        (5’) 
We check the relationship Imports-Final Consumption for the European Union (27), which 
shows up more clearly on a time scale (taking care of a possible non coincident x axis): final 
consumption and imports growth rates took a simultaneous and sharp decline from 2011Q2, 
final consumption decreased in a row since 2011Q4 until 2013Q2, while imports declined 
from 2012Q1 to 2013Q2. Imports’ decline began in Spain and Portugal since 2010Q2, 
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followed by Italy in 2010Q4 and France in 2011Q1, closely associated with a corresponding 
decline of final consumption: final consumption declined continuously from 2011Q2 in Spain, 
2011Q1 in Portugal, 2011Q3 in Italy. A profile of double-dip recession arises, with different 
amplitude, for all these countries: economic crisis spread from Greece, to Spain and Portugal, 
to Italy and, to a minor extent, to France.     
Figure 19 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
The extension of the imports-final consumption relationship to the current account-final 
consumption at the level of European Union requires the small country assumption for the 
countries’ export, with the only exception of Germany:  a small country has no market power 
in the international trade, as it happens with the Germany’s export of cars in China. We 
analyze the relationship between the current account balance and the rates of change of the 
final consumption (over the corresponding period of the previous year) for the European 
Union: for each variable we take a three quarters moving average, therefore omitting the first 
and last quarters in the comparison of the two series, over the period from 2008Q1 to 2013Q3. 
Final consumption quarterly changes, year on year, have a clear impact on the current 
account of the European Union, which was slightly in deficit from 2008Q2 until 2009Q2 and 
afterwards went positive and increasing, as a share of GDP. Final consumption changes fell 
sharply since 2010Q4 and became negative since 2012Q1: correspondingly the current 
account surplus increased, reaching a maximum at the end of the period considered (figure 
20).  
 Italy and Spain were key for the aggregate dynamic of the European Union, because of their 
economic weight and their wide swings. In Italy the final consumption fell since 2010Q4 and 
became negative since 2011Q3 and continued its downward trend afterward: the current 
account deficit followed suit, becoming rapidly positive. In Spain the reverse of the current 
account was more dramatic, starting from around 10% of the GDP at the beginning of 2008 
and turning positive in the second quarter of 2012: the counterpart was a steady decline of 
final consumption for the entire period 2008Q1-2013Q3, except for 3 quarters. The case of 
Portugal is a mixture of the patterns in Italy and Spain: it started from an even higher current 
account deficit at the beginning of the period, the final consumption showed a double-dip 
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becoming (again) negative in 2011Q1 and the current account reached the balance at the 
beginning of 2013. It is worth considering the parallel experience of France and Germany: 
France recorded a slight decrease of final consumption only in the fourth quarters of 2011 
and the first quarter of 2012, while the current account deficit remained negative but stable: 
in Germany the final consumption was steadily increasing, except for one quarter: the current 
account was positive at a high level (as a share of GDP) and from the 5,8% in 2011Q2 
increased to 7,2% in 2013Q1 (moving average values) (see Appendix F).   
Figure 20 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
11.  Internal devaluation and inflation rates differentials 
The convergence of “prices and quantities” among the European countries is the main 
economic and political goal:a steady divergence of inflation between countries with a 
common currency cannot be sustained in the long run, because it is the cause of structural 
imbalances which need to be removed. Inside the member of the Euro Area the key magnitude  
becomes the real effective exchange rate (REER), which, for two countries, can be reduced to 
the bilateral difference of the inflation rates: 
   
        ̇    ̇                      (8) 
 
The real Italian/Germany exchange rate can be defined as the ratio between the Italian and 
the German price level of a given basket (depending on which is the foreign country), while 
(in our notation) the real change is the difference between the Italian and the German 
inflation rates. If the inflation rate in Italy is higher than the inflation rate in Germany, say 
+10%, a given basket will cost 10% more to the Italian consumers and the real exchange rate 
will increases +10%, that is a real exchange depreciation for the Italian Euro. On the other 
side the German people going to Italy on vacation should find out that goods and services are 
10% less expensive than in Germany, a real appreciation. If we start with the same wage level, 
a 10% inflation gap would give to the German workers a larger purchasing power. Indeed the 
hourly wage levels in Germany are already higher than in Italy: in 2012 the hourly labour cost 
were 35,4 euro in Germany industry (27,3 in Italy), 24,7 in construction (25,6 in Italy) and 
28,4 in services (27,3 in Italy). Because for a consumer a lower price is better than a higher 
price, for the same good, we should expect a correction through some form of competition or 
arbitrage, as it happens when on vacation or with cross-border shopping. A common currency 
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area is optimal if arbitrage is allowed and feasible for goods, labor and capital: to achieve this 
goal appropriates rules and institutions are required, but unfortunately they are still 
uncomplete in the Euro Area, where the issue is now vital because its members gave up the 
instrument of external devalution, and is anyway crucial for the other European Union 
countries, which can still retain the instrument. 
 
Figure 21 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
As an example for the goods markets we compare the price index of Italy and France, with 
Germany as a benchmark, because its inflation rate has been the lowest in the period 1999-
2012. Italy’s rate of inflation was always higher with respect to Germany (except in 2007): 
France had also a higher rate of inflation with respect to Germany (except 2001, 2007 and 
2009) but always lower with respect to Italy (except 2010). As as consequence, between 1999 
and 2012 inflation increased +24,6% in Germany, +28% in France and +36% in Italy (figure 
21): on average +1% each year, considering Italy versus Germany, and +0,7% taking Italy 
versus France.  The long term consequence of a steady inflation divergence is a growing loss 
of Italy’s competitiveness, implying an increasing real exchange rate, and an increasing 
current account deficit: while external depreciation is the instrument to restore the balance of 
the current account with a system a floating exchange rate, with a common currency a 
possible instrument is the internal devalutation, which implies an array of changes, like 
freezing wages and salaries, removing indexation or a straighforward reduction of wages and 
prices. 
 
Relying on the instrument of internal devalutation the IMF makes two specific policy 
recommendation: “(1) a fall in the price of  non tradable goods relative to tradable goods to 
help reorient domestic production towards tradable; and (2) a decline in the price of domestic 
tradable goods relative to foreign tradable goods to help boost external competitiveness and 
exports. In other words, a relative price adjustment with respect to trading partner would 
bolster the competitiveness of the external sector (external balance), while the reallocation of 
resources from the non tradable to the stronger tradable sectors would stimulate the overall 
economy to help it to reach full employment (internal balance)” (IMF, World Economic 
Outlook, October 2013, p. 45). Indeed, since the pioneering analysis by Swan (1955) and 
Salter (1959), external devaluation (expenditure switching) can be an effective instrument to 
bring back to balance the current account only if it is well coupled with an “absorption” policy 
(expenditure-changing), i.e. a demand reduction which can be accomplished throught a 
thightening of fiscal and monetary policy. The appropriate balance between the two 
instruments is crucial to achieve both internal and external balance: however, as Salter 
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already pointed many years ago, with the internal devalutation the adjustment process would 
be “painful” and correspondigly high the chance of settling down in the “unhappy” situation of 
high unemployment (like Spain or Italy), for an exceedingly long period, and an inflation rate 
which is “too” low, trying to catch up and overdo the already low inflation in Germany. A 
currency union, in which the current account of each country matters, requires a long run 
convergence of inflation rates: however this could prove to be a structural problem for 
countries with a low GDP per capita, needing to converge at a faster speed of GDP and a higher 
rate of inflation. In the short run the reduction of the inflation gap with respect to Germany is 
on this way since the summer 2013 in Italy, after a prolonged contraction in consumption, 
while it is close to zero in Portugal, Ireland, Spain and records an outright deflation in Greece: 
in fact the European price index measure prices at their nominal value and does not take 
account of recurring on and off discounts, except for the seasonal: therefore the discounted 
price inflation at the end of 2013 is probably negative also for the other countries.  
Krugman (2012) suggests three fixes, in an attempt of not wasting the European Union 
project: Europe-wide backing of banks, the ECB as lender of last resort and a higher inflation 
target; for countries like Italy and Spain, in the light of the previous analysis, we suggest also 
an industrial and competitive policy aimed at removing inefficiencies, rather than cutting 
wages and purchasing power. The previous comparison between Italy and Germany, extended 
to the main subcategories of individual consumption by purpose (COICOP), allows a better 
understanding of the wide scope of an industrial policy. We consider first a subcategory which 
can be broadly classified as non tradeable, i.e. expenditure for housing, water, electricity, gas 
and other fuel, whose share of households consumers’ expenditures is 24% in Germany and 
11% in Italy. Inflation between 1999 and 2012 was +39% in Germany and +60% in Italy, 
therefore widening the inflationary gap from 11 point to 21 points (Figure 22) 
 
Figure 22   
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
If we consider, to the opposite, a category which can be broadly called as tradeable, i.e. the 
category of transport, which is made up of purchase of vehicles, motor cars, motor cycle, spare 
parts, fuel, maintenance, transport by railway, road, air and sea, the inflationary gap Italy-
Germany shrinks to 10 points in 2012, while until 2010 is the same as France and  Germany 
(Figure 23). The share of transport is 16% of total households expenditures in Italy, 17% in 
France and 14% in Germany, 
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Figure 23 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
The third group is made up of quasi-tradable goods, under the heading of food and non-
alcoholic beverages (bread, meat, fish, milk, oils, fruit, vegetables, sugar): “quasi” because the 
goods are perishable and the opportunity of export are  therefore more limited, but still 
possible with low cost of rapid transport.  The share of food and non-alcholic beverages is 
17% of total households expenditures in Italy, 16% in France and 12% in Germany, while the 
inflationary gap between Italy and Germany is 13 points, the same as the average.  It seems 
therefore that, rather then prompting a deflation on purchasing power and consumption, it is 
possible: a) to modify relative prices improving efficiency in the goods market, targeting the 
construction sector, to avoid booms and bust, like in Spain and Ireland, with the consequence 
of rising rents and b) shortening the goods supply chain, like food, delivered domestically and  
exported to the closer countries, because the longer is the chain the higher is the inflation 
multiplier. 
 
Figure 24 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
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12. The Germany-China Syndrome: Dissecting Germany’s international trade. 
The growing current account surplus of Germany has been analyzed by few contributions, 
aimed at explaining the underlying causes and consequences on other EU members: an 
interesting result (Kollman et al. 2013) using a DSGE model is the high elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and imported products (3.0) in Germany, which can help to 
explain the diverging pattern of the sharp increase of exports with China, while the trade 
balance has been positive only in the most recent years. The Germany’s economic imbalance 
in Europe is causing concerns also in the US, where the Department of Treasury has pointed 
out that “Germany has maintained a large current account surplus throughout the euro 
financial crisis, and in 2012, Germany’s nominal current account surplus was larger than that 
of China” and as consequence “The net result has been a deflationary bias for the euro area, as 
well as for the world economy” (2013, p. 25). It was not always this way.  
 
Figure 25 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
Germany’s economic growth in the first decade of 2000 was driven by the exports, whose 
share of GDP was 33% in 2000, a bit higher than in Italy, with 27%: from the 2000 to 2012 the 
share of export on GDP jumped to 52% in Germany and increased slightly to 30% in Italy 
(figure 25): a positive relationship exists between Germany’s exports, as a share of GDP, and 
the external balance of goods and services, as a share of GDP. To explain this structural change 
we need to consider that over the year 2000 two fundamental events happened, with 
profound and lasting consequences: the onset of the European Monetary Union, in 1999, and  
the entry of China in the WTO in December 2011. The eruption of the Great Recession, in 2008 
was the origin of  a new wave of structural changes on the European economy, leaded by 
Germany, whose intra-EU(27) trade balance peaked in 2007, and then dropped from 126 
billions to around 43 billions in 2013: at the same time the extra-UE(27) trade jumped from 
72 billions in 2007 to 152 billion in 2013 (Figure 26 - 2013 is our estimate). The reversal of 
trade flows signals a tilt of the Germany exports and imports outside the European Union and 
helps to explain why Germany went through the European recession, together with its 
geograpical closer countries, without the economic losses which burdened Southern 
European countries.  
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 Figure 26 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database (2013 our estimate) 
 
Considering the Germany’s trade balance, ranked by value of the more important partners 
and for selected years, we can appreciate the above mentioned statement by the US 
Department of Treasury: United States is the country which has secured to Germany the 
largest and increasing trade balance since the 2000 and therefore provided a sizable share 
contribution to its high and growing current account surplus:France and United Kingdom 
follow suit with the same pattern. The Germany trade balance is also in surplus with respect 
to the boundary countries like Austria, Denmark, Poland and Sweden: Germany’s has also 
close connections with The Netherland, recording however a sizable negative deficit, mainly 
due to the imports of mineral fuels (19 billions), energy machinery (3 billions), iron, steel and 
aluminium products (3 billions).  However Germany records a substantial trade surplus with 
the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, both totalling a trade surplus of almost 17 billions. 
Germany’s surplus with Italy and Spain peaked in 2007, then plunging back in 2013, down to 
a level lower than in 2000. Regarding Asian countries, Germany records a surplus with South-
Korea, Hong Kong,  Singapore, India, Japan: it come as a surprise that, in spite of the sharp 
increase of exports to China (from 10 billions in 2000 to more than 60 billion in 2013), the 
trade balance has become positive only since 2011 (partly because of a decrease in imports 
from China). Obviously the reason is that, in the meantime, Germany’s imports from China 
have increased simultaneously: to understand causes and consequences of this structural 
change we need a closer scrutiny of the pattern of trade between Germany and China. 
Germany’s trade pattern is simultaneously intraindustry and interindustry, reflecting 
comparative advantages and natural endowments: standard economic theory (Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 2009) helps to explain the pattern of interindustry trade, between Germany, which 
exports to China capital-abundant products (like vehicles and pharmaceutical product), and 
imports from China, labor-intensive goods (like textiles and footwear).   As China is continuing 
its growth and the internal market becomes evolute, product differention grows and with it 
intraindustry trade, prompted by the huge size of its domestic demand. The following analysis 
focuses on the structure of imports by main product, trying to detect the possible effects of 
Germany’s import growth on other European countries. 
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Table 5 
  GERMANY'S TRADE BALANCE 
Country/Year 2013 2007 2000 
UNITED STATES 51.016 38.226 22.716 
FRANCE 33.607 27.010 15.570 
UNITED KINGDOM 30.758 27.637 12.430 
AUSTRIA 17.195 18.985 11.149 
ARAB EMIRATES 8.943 5.385 1.944 
CHINA 8.369 -18.873 -7.666 
SAUDI ARABIA 7.579 4.423 1.598 
KOREA (South) 7.533 -1.027 -1.000 
SPAIN 7.527 27.199 11.060 
SWEDEN 7.214 7.714 3.639 
ITALY 6.213 19.601 9.602 
BRAZIL 5.626 625 1.987 
POLAND 4.898 11.942 2.713 
DENMARK 4.832 3.325 299 
HON KONG 4.214 2.703 1.896 
SINGAPORE 3.890 2.451 704 
INDIA 3.413 2.966 -213 
JAPAN 2.185 -5.353 -10.347 
RUSSIAN FEDER. -1.329 437 -7.603 
NETHERLAND -55.237 -29.410 -21.843 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database (2013 our estimate) 
 
Table 6 
Products imported in Germany from China (millions euro) 
Products 2012 2007 2000 2012-2000 % total Trade bal. 
Electrical machinery, sounder 14.990 12.367 4.240 10.750 24,4 -7.053 
Boilers and appliances 12.468 10.725 2.099 10.369 23,6 5.396 
Articles of apparel not knitted 3.532 3.110 1.064 2.468 5,6 -3.479 
Articles of apparel knitted 2798 1781 709 2.088 4,7 -2.776 
Ship, boats 2.140 1.224 31 2.109 4,8 -2.119 
Furniture, bedding, mattresses 2.622 1.692 601 2.021 4,6 -2.284 
Footwear 1.526 923 300 1.226 2,8 -1.503 
Organic chemical 1.405 780 297 1.108 2,5 -560 
Toys, games, sports 2.210 3.005 1.198 1.012 2,3 -2.184 
Articles of iron or steel 1.367 1.242 404 963 2,2 -233 
Optical, photo, measuring 1.724 1.029 799 925 2,1 2.830 
Plastic and articles 1.274 882 495 779 1,8 557 
Vehicles 991 603 341 650 1,5 17.894 
Other made-up textiles 780 537 235 545 1,2 -769 
Miscellaneous of base metal 620 415 113 507 1,2 -301 
Other 11.184 8.412 4.199 6.986 15 4.820 
Total imports 61.631 48.727 17.125 44.506 100,0 5.537 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
 
Germany’s imports from China are spread on all the industries, but are also highly 
concentrated in few products: four products makes more than half of the imports’ increase 
between 2012 and 2000 and the products selected represent 85% of Germany’s total imports 
from China. Germany has a deficit trade balance for almost all the products selected, with the 
exception of the vehicles, optical and photograpic, boiler and appliances and plastic, for which 
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Germany records a positive surplus: the products with only a negative deficit total 17,8 
billions (2012), while the products with positive surplus and miscellaneous product total 23,4 
billion, for a positive (estimated) balance of 5,5 billions. 
 The question is whether the increased import competition, derived by the increasing imports  
in Germany from China, produced adverse economic effects in Europe. This is what has 
happened in the US, causing higher unemployment and prompting a decline in US 
manufacturing employment (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013): in Germany import competition 
takes the form of a change in the global value chain, with China imports competing also with 
other European manufacturers, supplying the German consumer market as well as the 
German factories.  
For the previous selection of products we compared Germany’s imports from China with the 
Germany’s imports from Italy and the US in the period 2012-2000: the results are that the 
corresponding US imports decreased for almost all the products, while Italy retained a 
positive surplus for appliances but decreased its exports to Germany for the article of apparel. 
For both countries there was therefore some import substitution.  
The economic benefit of the increasing Germany’s import-export with China has to be 
evaluated in relation to the global chain value and the terms of trade: we look therefore at the 
average value per chilogram of the imports and exports of Germany with China, comparing it 
with the corresponding average values of Italy’s imports and exports with China. We find that 
the Germany’s average value of exports to China has steadily increased from 2000 to 2012, 
while the average value of Italian exports declined from 2001 to 2003 and then remained 
stable. The average value of Germany’s imports from China has also increased, in line with the 
average value of exports: since 2009 the Germany terms of trade improved while in Italy 
worsened along with an increase of average value of imports from China (figure  27). The  
question is whether this argument can provide a policy indication for economic growth, 
because a high average value for a product, net of imported inputs, means a high value added. 
Germany’s trade with China is characterized by a high average value, like for the exports of 
vehicles and pharmaceutical products, reflecting a high value added and quality of the 
products exported: quality is a matter of size only if it implies a significant investment in 
Research and Development, while the size of China market offers ample opportunities also for 
smaller countries targeting diversified market segments with high value added.   
  
Figure 27 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
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Conclusions. 
The Great Recession hit Europe twice: the first time through the exogenous shock of the US 
crisis and the second time as a consequence of the fiscal consolidation and internal 
devaluation policies implemented to face the Sovereign Debt Crisis. The crucial divide, which 
followed, is the diverging path of countries with increasing unemployment rates and 
countries with decreasing unemployment rates, while instead the inflation rates are 
uniformly converging to a worrisome low level. Half of the European population lost ground 
while the other half improved their standard of living: the economic divide should be 
removed befor putting at risk the social coesion of the European Union.  Our attempt to 
unbundle the European crisis focuses on five key aggregates: unemployment, consumption, 
investment, inflation and current account. The empirical evidence supports a chain of 
causation which starts with the shock of fiscal consolidation and internal devaluation, which 
decreases domestic final consumption, prompts a fall in investment and the increases of 
unemployment, coupled with a drop of inflation; the falling domestic demand curtails imports 
and, given stable or increasing exports, improves the current account and brings it to balance. 
The restraint of consumption, through the fiscal consolidation and internal devaluation, has 
been a success in rebalancing the current account and has partially achieved the goal of 
reducing the public deficit. The downside is the toll of a deep economic recession and 
increasing unemployment, while inflation rate has fallen below 1%, sparking fears of deflation. 
It is well known that the Euro Area is not an optimal currency area, but internal devalution 
has proved to be the problem, rather than the solution, because it is a very imperfect 
substitute of currency devalutation. The strenght of economic ties with China and Asian 
countries, added to the US, helped Germany and the closer countries to go through the 
recession without economic losses, but tilted Germany’s economic interests outside the 
European Union and prompted a leap of the export, as a share of GDP. However it is not clear 
how sustainable can be an export led pattern of growth for a country with the size of Germany, 
when the export of good and services, as a share of GDP, is so higher than US, Japan and China. 
The crucial issue is that the Southern European countries have definitely shrinked the size of 
their economies and the question is how long it will take for their standard of living to return 
to the pre-crisis level and if this goal can be achieved without renewed imbalances.    
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